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Abstract
The financial crime landscape is evolving along with the digitization in financial services. In this
context, laws and regulations cannot efficiently cope with a fast-moving industry such as finance,
which translates in late adoption of measures and legal voids, providing a fruitful landscape for ma-
licious actors. In parallel, blockchain technology and its promising features such as immutability,
verifiability, and authentication, enhance the opportunities of financial forensics. In this paper, we
focus on an embezzlement scheme and we provide a forensic-by-design methodology for its investi-
gation. In addition, the feasibility and adaptability of our approach can be extended and embrace
digital investigations on other types of schemes. We provide a functional implementation based
on smart contracts and we integrate standardised forensic flows and chain of custody preservation
mechanisms. Finally, we discuss the benefits and challenges of the symbiotic relationship between
blockchain and financial investigations, along with future research directions.
Index terms— Forensics · Blockchain · Chain of Custody · Embezzlement · Fraud detection
JEL Classification K42 · K41 · M42 · G21
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1 Introduction
The impact of fraud and economic crime on all organisations worldwide, still reaches high-record levels.
The most frequent committed fraud scheme is asset misappropriation, where an employee is stealing
or misusing organization’s resources [1]. A provocative question arising when it comes to fight fraud is
about the deployed technologies during investigation.
Recently, the importance of industry 4.0 applications in financial forensics 1 has come into
limelight. Big data advanced analytic techniques, such as machine learning and cognitive computing,
cyber-security,and automating processes are some of the trends in the field of forensics in the financial
services sector. In this work, we choose a real world embezzlement scenario and apply the forensic-by-
design architecture of blockchain to validate audit-trail’s integrity. The source documentation captured
in the trail are hard copies, CCTV tapes, excel spreadsheet etc.
The sequence of custody, control, transfer and disposition of these evidence is called chain of
custody. The chain of custody indicates who had access to records and thus the degree of difficulty in
manipulation. It assures that evidence is not damaged or altered in any way, since gaps in the chain
may illustrate mishandling of evidence which leads to damaging the case [2]. The importance of chain of
custody is highlighted when the fraud investigator has to perform one of the most challenging tasks which
is to put financial information in simple terms so as to be understandable from decision makers (senior
management, prosecutor etc). The collection, examination, analysis, interpretation and presentation of
digital evidence shapes investigations is crucial in proving embezzlement cases where digital evidence is
prevalent, because the employee under investigation may be well aware of bank’s systems, procedures
and control gaps. In this regard, recent work in the digital forensic community has established reliable
scientific methodologies and common standards in its workflows [3, 4]. Yet, it still faces many challenges
due to the volatile and malleable nature of the evidence and the continuous advances in technology
that introduce new attack vectors [5, 6]. Moreover, most of the criminal activity on the Internet is
orchestrated at international level, generating cross-jurisdiction problems of cooperation and information
1Financial forensics is a methodology which combines investigation and auditing skills to identify evidence for a potential
fraudulent activity that might end up in litigation. Fraudulent activities might derive either from within or outside the
organization.
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exchange that can be alleviated by common standards and protocols. From the challenges identified in
the literature [7, 8, 9, 10], the most relevant ones are related to legal systems and/or law enforcement
cooperation, technical challenges, and to the validity and trustworthiness of evidence. Moreover, this
issues are exacerbated when multiple stakeholders are involved in the overall forensics process.
In parallel to the digitization of financial services, blockchain technology [11] has experienced
a wide adoption due to the myriad of possibilities and applications that it enables [12, 13]. Setting
aside the different categorizations of blockchain in terms of applications and consensus algorithms (i.e.
the methodology to reach an agreement between the different participants of the blockchain network to
validate a transaction), they offer different features, such as auditability, security, decentralization and
transparency [14, 12]. In addition, blockchains also provide immutability [15, 6], which is a interesting
feature, yet poses significant challenges to principles such as the right to be forgotten or the EU General
Data Protection Regulation Directive (GDPR) [16].
Blockchain applications in the financial context are already a fact [17, 18, 12]. Nevertheless,
blockchain capabilities can also be used maliciously to enable cryptocurrency fraud scams such as invest-
ment and ponzi schemes, embezzlement, phishing, and ransomware [19]. Therefore, investing efforts to
prosecute fraud as well as its prevention in both traditional and next generation systems is mandatory.
In this regard, the literature is still scarce in blockchain-based methods oriented to fraud prevention
[20, 21]. Promising research lines such as crypto de-anonymization methods have the potential to enable
successful investigations and prosecutions [22], yet such solutions have many constraints, as well as not
being feasible in cryptocurrencies such as Monero.
Based on the above requirements, it is apparent that the blockchain features may enhance
forensic procedures [23]. For instance, the immutability of blockchain can guarantee the verifiability of
the chain of custody of evidences and provide an auditable trail of events. The latter is mandatory to
be presented as a solid proof in a courtroom.
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1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we address the relevance of blockchain technology and its inherent features for management
of evidence in forensic investigations. We are concerned with a case study that occurs within a financial
institution. This type of fraud is also known as bank fraud. In this context, we will examine an
embezzlement scheme for unauthorised withdrawals. The detection method used is a review of the
source documentation that might confirm or refute the allegation of embezzlement.
In addition, we provide a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in blockchain forensics
and we propose a blockchain-based architecture for embezzlement’ fraudulent activities enabling a sound
preservation of the chain of custody. This architecture and the forensic flows are implemented according
to well-known standards and guidelines, such as the ones described in Section 4.3. Moreover, we provide
an implementation based on Ethereum and smart contracts to preserve the chain of custody as well as the
trail of events. Overall, our solution enables diverse features and benefits, such as integrity verification,
tamper proof, and future enhancement of similar investigations. In addition, we discuss several measures
to improve the adaptability of our system towards similar crimes, and we provide a fertile common
ground for further research.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides a blockchain based forensic
sound procedure for embezzlement and an implementation based on smart contracts.
2 Background
In simple terms, embezzlement is the misappropriation of funds that have been entrusted to an employee
for care or management. It occurs when trusted employees rationalise dishonest actions towards the
financial assets of an organization.
For the purpose of our analysis, we reviewed prior researches related to embezzlement schemes.
Nevertheless, the existing literature gives little attention to the embezzlement schemes performed within
financial institutions. To begin with, embezzlement schemes are more likely to be realized in situations
when either the separation of duties or the relevant audit trails are weak or nonexistent. One of the
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most common types is the unauthorised withdrawals from customer accounts [24] and may take various
forms. For instance it could be stealing money from customers by providing encoded deposit slips [25]
or borrowing from today’s account’s receivable and replace them with tomorrow’s receipts. In all cases,
a scheme to be successful requires the creation of false data, reports, or data entries [26].
To uncover embezzlement schemes, investigators have to develop a hypothesis about the se-
quence of events and apply certain fraud analytics tools. Tools such as relational databases, excel
spreadsheets may identify any relevant source of information which can further support the hypothesis
in litigation proceedings [24, 27, 28]. In the investigation, forensic data collection is one of the most
important issues. This is interpreted as maintaining a chain of custody for data and performing data
integrity validation to ensure tamper-proofness [28, 29].
3 Related works
Despite the suitability of blockchain towards preserving a trail of events in an immutable and verifiable
manner, only recently authors have started to explore it.
In order to retrieve the relevant literature in blockchain, we queried the Scopus database by
using the keywords “blockchain” and “forensics”, and we located further studies by means of the snowball
effect (i.e. additional literature referenced by the articles found in the initial search). In total, 28 articles
were selected according to a specific criteria (i.e. we peer-reviewed and excluded some papers based
on their structural quality, language, and subject area). Next, we performed a keyword-based and
topic classification, depicted in Figure 1. Therefore, we identified eight different blockchain forensic
application topics which span from 2018 to the present, being the most populated the ones related with
data management, IoT, and cloud.
In the context of cloud forensics, a framework to enable fast incident response was proposed
in [30]. In [31], the authors created a collaboration and evidence management framework to improve
the coordination of investigations when different stakeholders are involved. In the case of [32] and [33],
authors focused in logging-as-a-service tools for securely storing and processing logs while coping with
issues of multi-stakeholder collusion, and the integrity and confidentiality of logs. In this context, security
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Figure 1: Summary of blockchain forensic topics and the number of publications per year.
and robust access mechanisms are mandatory, as discussed in [34].
The works classified in data management topic present different models for data processing
based on scalable solutions such as permissioned blockchains [35, 36, 37] and blockchains using lightweight
consensus mechanisms [38]. Other relevant features showcased by authors are the verifiability of the
trail of events [39, 40] and the classification of the evidence in terms of features, enabling further data
processing [41].
The evidence collected from IoT devices and the interactions between different stakeholders are
one of the main features studied in the literature [42, 43, 44, 45]. In addition, privacy-preserving identity
management [46] is a mandatory feature to be considered in such context.
The blockchain-based mobile forensic research focuses on applications and malware detection.
In this regard, authors propose the use of consortium blockchains to detect malware and based on
statistical analysis of each application’s feature [47, 48].
The multimedia forensic topic includes works related with processing and storing CCTV video
evidence [49], the multimedia evidence captured by smartphones [50] and image-based provenance and
integrity [51].
In the healthcare context, the work presented in [52] proposes a blockchain-enabled autho-
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rization framework for managing both the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) devices and healthcare
stakeholders. Smart grid forensics and its relevance is discussed in [53]. Moreover, the authors showcase
the benefits of blockchain towards enhancing energy optimization, security and managerial tasks.
Transportation forensics has captured the interest of researchers due to its timely relevance
due to its seamless relationship with emerging technologies such as self-driving automation, IoT-based
sensing, and 5G communication networks [54]. Nevertheless, such novel frameworks and the adoption of
new data privacy frameworks (like the GDPR) call for the development of sound forensic mechanisms
to analyze traffic accidents and protect users’ sensitive data. For instance, in [55], the author proposes
a system to manage user’s requests and their compliance with legal frameworks.
A privacy-preserving framework is also proposed in [56], this time for managing sensitive nav-
igation data while ensuring user’s anonymity. In [57], the authors propose a blockchain-based forensics
system that enables traceable and privacy-aware post-accident analysis with minimal requirements in
storage and processing. In [54] a blockchain-based framework is proposed for keeping logs of all hardware
profile changes and updates in a vehicle.
Finally, we analysed the maturity of the literature according to their development stage in
Table 1. In general, we may observe that the majority of solutions are in an early stage and thus, more
efforts need to be devoted to this research field to exploit all the potential of blockchain. A more detailed
exploration of the blockchain forensics literature can be found in [58]
4 Method
In the following sections, we will describe the case study and the actors involved, our blockchain-based
forensic architecture, and the forensic methodology applied to such case.
4.1 A case study for an embezzlement scheme.
Let Malory be a malicious bank employee who worked at Golden Bank in Albany, Oregon for 15 years.
In addition, Malory was promoted to the Head Teller position in the Central Branch five years ago. He
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Table 1: Maturity of blockchain-based forensics literature.
Implementation & Tests Partial Implementation Not Provided
[32] [45] [30][35]
[33] [47] [41] [43]
[38] [40] [44] [42] [55]
[31] [54] [56]
[50] [53] [57]
[34] [39]
[52] [51] [37]
[49] [36] [46] [48]
was living beyond means; driving a expensive car and being the owner of an expensive home. As he was
working for many years in the same branch, he had developed a good relationship with affluent clients
of the branch that where living abroad.
Within such period, the Branch Manager received an oral complaint by the client Alice, who
was contesting the balance recorded in the passbook of his saving account. The Branch Manager tried to
trail the vouchers of his last transactions but were missing from the physical record. The responsibility
of the missing vouchers lied to Malory. The Branch manager, informed the Internal Audit Department
of the bank to investigate the case.
The investigation’s result was that Malory had embezzled 500,000 US$ from a network of 10
clients with similar profile characteristics to Alice (elderly customers living abroad). These clients were
served in the branch that Malory was a Head teller. Malory tap into customers’ saving accounts to
wire funds without authorization for 5 years and proceeded unauthorized withdrawals. Malory used the
cancel transaction field as a markdown for the embezzled money on each account, so as to keep track
what needs to be returned to each account before the client appeared in the branch.
Figure 2 presents part of Malory’s scheme for a selected sample of three clients. In this case,
Malory has embezzled a total amount of 300 $ by performing unauthorized transactions among clients
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disrespecting the bank’s procedures. The next paragraphs describe explicitly three days where Malory
acted on behalf of clients and for his own interest.
Figure 2: A case study for an embezzlement scheme.
In Day 1, Malory being alone in the cash desk of the bank’s branch performed an unauthorised
cash withdrawal of 700 $ from the banking account of Alice. A minute after he performs an unauthorised
cash deposit in the banking account of Bob. From these two transactions he puts 200$ in his wallet from
the cash difference in the bank’s ledger. The only evidence from this irregular behaviour is tracked in
the CCTV surveillance system, since the physical vouchers linked to unauthorised transactions are lost.
At this point of time, Alice has a debit balance of 700 $ and Bod a credit balance of 500 $.
Next, in Day 2, Malory performs an unauthorised cash withdrawal of 500$ from the banking
account of Bob, and credits Claire’s saving account with an equal amount. At the end of the day, Bob’s
balance becomes zero while Claire’s balance is credited with 500 $. Similar to Day 1, the only evidence
from this irregular behaviour is tracked in the CCTV surveillance system.
A day later, Malory performs an unauthorised withdrawal from the account of Claire of 400$
and deposits back to client Alice an amount of 300$ keeping for himself 100$. At this point Claire’s
9
Prosecutor
Bank’s Senior Management
Internal Audit /Investigators
BranchIT Department Surveillance Department
Legal Department
Human Resources 
Department
Figure 3: Actors involved in the embezzlement scheme
account has a credit balance of 100$ and Alice’s account has a debit balance of 400$. Same as above,
no voucher bears clients’ signatures and the only evidence that can track his irregular behaviour is the
daily CCTV recording.
4.2 Actors Involved
The main actors involved during the investigation of the above embezzlement scheme are presented in
figure 3. Now, we will describe how each actor is involved in the chain of custody.
Firstly, the branch archived the written complain of the client contesting the balance recorded
in the passbook of his saving account. It was also responsible for the archiving of original vouchers
related to the transactions signed by each customer and for the historic record of CCTV material.
The Internal Audit received the written declaration of the complain through the internal mail of
the bank and e-mail communication. Original hard copies of the complaint are stored in separate physical
folder linked to Malory’s case. The physical folder is scanned at the end of the case and archived in
a shared folder with authorised accesses. This folder also includes any hard copies which prove the
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fraud hypothesis (CCTV files, original vouchers, signatures’ specimen etc), the signed testimony 2 of
Maroly and the a signed report released with investigation results 3. Digital documentation is archived
in the local server of the department and only authorised users may have access. For the investigation’s
purposes, the Internal Audit interacts with the bank’s IT department, Surveillance Department, the
Branch and Human Resources (HR) Department.
IT Department assists Internal Audit by providing data from the database of core banking
system. The data are sent via e-mail usually as an excel file concerning transactions and daily journal
of entries of Malory. Also, when Internal Audit needs to trace additional CCTV files, it collaborates
with Surveillance Department. The latter delivers any CCTV files upon request through USB. Each
employee has a physical record with personal information archived in HR Department. This information
distributed to investigators through emails. Also, it is responsible for the archiving of disciplinary board’s
proceedings.
When the investigation’s report is issued, Senior Management receives it. Its role is to de-
cide and approve any disciplinary and litigation actions. Decisions and approvals are documented and
archived. If the decision involves litigation actions then Legal Department undergoes the submission to
a prosecuting authority.
At last, the Prosecutor receives a structured package including the disciplinary board’s decision,
the findings’ report and a copy of physical evidence and proceeds to further legal actions.
4.3 Forensic Procedure
Despite that one of the main issues in the digital forensics research field is the standardisation of proce-
dures according to each topic or context [59], there exist several well-known forensic guidelines and models
[60, 61, 62], which are summarised in Table 2. Moreover, a review of the international development of
forensic standards, such as ISO/IEC 27043:2015, can be found in [63] and [64].
2The testimony is recorded as a written agreement between Malory and two investigators (signed by each of them).
3A hard copy of the report is distributed internally to Senior management, HR department and legal department (i.e.
these actors are defined later in this section). The recipients sign a mail record which is then archived in the physical folder
of the case.
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Table 2: Most well-known forensic models and guidelines.
Name Year Reference
Digital Forensic Investigation Model 2001 [65]
Digital Forensic Research Workshop 2001 [66]
Abstract Digital Forensic Model 2002 [67]
Integrated Digital Investigation Model 2004 [68]
Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model 2004 [69]
Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation 2004 [70]
NIST Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response 2006 [61]
Digital Forensic Model for Digital Forensic Investigation 2011 [71]
International Organization for Standardization ISO/IEC 27043:2015 2015 [72]
INTERPOL Guidelines for Digital Forensics Laboratories 2019 [62]
ENFSI Guidelines 2016-2020 [73]
In general, the procedures summarised in Table 2 have a common hierarchical structure, which
can be divided in the steps described in Table 3. Note that, evidence custody changes as well as evidence
destruction are two relevant steps that, although not mapped in the high level description provided in
Table 3, are included in our system implementation.
Table 3: Main steps in a digital forensic investigation model.
Forensic Step Description
Identification Assess the purpose and context of the investigation. Initialize and allo-
cate the resources required for the investigation, such as policies, proce-
dures and personnel.
Collection & Acquisition The seizure, storage and preservation of digital evidence. Although this
two steps need to be strictly differentiated in the physical forensics con-
text, we consider a more relaxed approach in the digital context, since
most of times data will be directly collected in a digital form.
Analysis The identification of tools and methods to process the evidence and the
analysis of the outcomes obtained
Reporting & Discovery The proper presentation of the reports and information obtained during
the investigation to be disclosed or shared with the corresponding entities.
In the case of chain of custody and trail of events preservation, we need to ensure that our
system enables features such as integrity, traceability, authentication, verifiability and security [40, 38].
In this regard, Table 4 provides a description of each feature and how our blockchain-based system
enables it.
12
Table 4: Main features required to guarantee chain of custody preservation.
Feature Description
Integrity The events data as well as evidences cannot be altered or corrupted during
the transferring and during analysis due to the use of hashes.
Traceability The events and evidences can be traced from their creation till their
destruction since every interaction is stored in an immutable ledger.
Authentication All the actors and entities are unique and provide an irrefutable proof of
identity due to the use of asymmetric cryptography.
Verifiability The transactions and interactions can be verified by the corresponding
actors. This verification can be performed in real time.
Security Only actors with clearance can add content or access to it. A robust
underlying consensus mechanism ensures that the transactions are signed
in a cryptographically secure way.
In addition, Figure 4 summarises the main tasks performed in each investigation phase accord-
ing to our case scenario, and their corresponding relationship with the forensic flow. Therefore, after
reporting the incident and initiating the investigation, the evidence collection and forensic analysis is
summarised in following steps:
1. Collection and analysis of the investigated accounts (including saving accounts of clients and their
correlation with employees’ accounts).
2. Analysis of the daily transactions recorded in the journal of entries of Malory (i.e. extractions from
core banking system).
3. Reconcile the time of transactions appearing in the journal entry with the CCTV time.
4. Review of CCTV files in order to trace the physical presence of the client and the suspect.
5. Collection of the testimony of the suspect(s) in signed hardcopy.
For an investigation to be sound, all the forensic steps need to be provable and, in the case
of evidence analysis, results need to be reproducible. In the case of internal audits, a malicious inves-
tigator could tamper evidence or the analysis performed on data to hide proofs. Therefore, a robust
forensic procedure is required to guarantee that evidence is collected in a sound manner and it is not
tampered during the analysis. Moreover, each forensic action has to be paired with an individual. The
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Figure 4: Embezzlement Forensic investigation main phases (top) and the corresponding actions per-
formed in our case study (bottom).
aforementioned requirements can be accomplished by means of the blockchain-based forensic architecture
described in the next section.
4.4 Blockchain-based Forensic Architecture
In this section, we describe our blockchain-based forensic architecture. In our setup, we assume that
the system is implemented in the context of a secure laboratory/investigation facility according to a
set of policies and regulations. These policies may define also a strict identity management system if
further restrictions need to be applied. Note that, since each region and country may apply different
policies, we leave their definition and discussion as a future research line. Nevertheless, our system can
accommodate more functionalities in the smart contract definition, as well as higher layer control systems
and application programming interfaces (API)s.
Considering the previously stated forensic flows and the characteristics of the embezzlement
scenario, the architecture of our method is depicted in Figure 5.
The first step involves the case creation. In this regard, a case can be registered due to a citizen’s
testimony (we include in this definition any individual that wants to report a crime) or directly by a
prosecutor (or an investigator with enough clearance to open a case) who observed suspicious behaviour.
Next, evidences are collected and analysed by using the appropriate forensic tools. The description of
14
Figure 5: Forensic flow and blockchain integration.
each action (e.g. storing an evidence and analysing an evidence) may have a description file associated
with JSON or CSV format, to ease further searches and classifications. We assume that secure and
private storage is used to preserve the evidences, but other platforms such as cloud-based storage or
decentralized storage systems such as the Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS) [74] can be used if data are
properly protected/encrypted (i.e. following the definitions set out in information security standards like
ISO/IEC 27001 [75] or other national IT-security guidelines). Thereafter, the outcomes of such analysis
and the related reports are also stored as part of the investigation. Finally, when the investigation
concludes, all the data can be collected and presented in court.
The aforementioned interactions are mapped into a smart contract and therefore stored perma-
nently in the blockchain. The latter guarantees the verifiability of the investigation due to the blockchain’s
immutability, as well as the preservation of the chain of custody, as mentioned early in Table 4. There-
fore, the investigation can be audited to certify that any evidence was tampered during the investigation,
guaranteeing the soundness of the different forensic procedures. In addition, our approach is designed
so that it can accommodate other digital investigation contexts apart from embezzlement, enhancing its
adaptability.
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5 Experiments and Integration Details
The interactions between the different actors of the system and the forensic events have been implemented
by means of a smart contract, and different tests have been performed in a local private blockchain to
showcase the feasibility and performance of the proposed method. More specifically, an Ethereum-based
blockchain using node4 and ganache-cli5 was created, and truffle6 was used to code and deploy a
fully functional smart contract. Moreover, a graphical interface was developed in order to query and
insert information stored in the blockchain by using node package manager npm 7, which also retrieves
the corresponding hash of the directory of a specific investigation and its link to the IPFS [74], along
with other detailed information. Therefore, the information of a specific investigation (or a set of them)
is graphically depicted for the user, as well as the option to store a new event, as seen in Figures 6 and
7, respectively.
Figure 6: Example of the outcome of a query by searching all cases and their corresponding IPFS links.
We have selected Ethereum due to its robust consensus mechanism as well as its smart contract
framework (i.e. we use solidity 0.5.0, which prevents vulnerabilities such as uninitialized storage pointer
4https://nodejs.org/
5https://github.com/trufflesuite/ganache-cli
6http://truffleframework.com
7https://nodejs.org/en/knowledge/getting-started/npm/what-is-npm/
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Figure 7: A detail of the form user to insert a new event to the system.
and erroneous visibility). For more information about the security of Ethereum and its smart contract
framework, we refer the interested reader to [76] and [77], respectively.
For the sake of completeness, a detailed description of the functions implemented in the smart
contract is provided in Table 5. As an additional feature, every time the information of the smart contract
is updated, a trigger() function is called, which can be used as an alert. Therefore, the investigators will
be able to check in real time the information about a given investigation using the get/retrieve functions
implemented in the smart contract for verification or managerial purposes.
A link between the smart contract’s functions and the forensic procedures is summarised in Table
6. In the case of custody change procedures, the involved actors will be stored in the corresponding list of
owners of the evidence along with a timestamp. Moreover, a new event can be created with an evidence
pointing to the same hash, yet with a new creation date to grasp the import of such evidence. In the
case of the destruction of an evidence, this procedure will change the status of the evidence to deleted.
In the latter case, the deletion of a file in a local storage is an easy task, yet the complete erasure of
the content in e.g. IPFS can only be made feasible through novel mechanisms [78], since IPFS does not
implement an erasure protocol at the time of writing [79, 6]. In the case of blockchain, the problem is
exacerbated due to its inherent immutability [16, 15, 80], and the best solution is to minimise the direct
storage of data (i.e. only pointers and hashes).
In addition to the benefits enabled by the smart contracts, it is essential to guarantee the privacy
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Table 5: Main characteristics and permissions of the functions implemented in the smart contract.The
permissions column states which functions are public (P) or restricted (R) only for specific users related
to a case.
Code Function Input Output Permissions Description
f1 constructor void na na creates the smart contract
f2 addCase String name, String description, String
responsible, String globalID, timestamp,
hash
void R adds a new case to the system
f3 updateCaseDescription Uint caseID, string description void R updates a case description
f4 updateCaseStatus Uint caseID, string status void R updates a case status
f5 updateResponsible Uint caseID, address responsible void R updates a the responsible of a case
f6 addInvestigatorCase Uint caseID, address investigator void R adds a new investigator to a case
f7 getNumberOfCases void Uint P returns the global number of cases
f8 getCase Uint caseID Object P returns a case object and its information
f9 getCaseGlobalID Uint caseID String P returns the global ID of a case
f10 getNumberofInvestigators Uint caseID Uint P returns the number of investigators
asigned to a case
f11 getCaseHash Uint caseID hash P returns the hash pointer with information
of a case
f12 addEvent Uint caseID, string type, String descrip-
tion, String status, hash, timestamp
void R adds a new event to a case
f13 updateEventStatus Uint eventID, string status void R updates an event/evidence status
f14 getNumberOfEventsCase Uint caseID Uint P returns the number of events of a case
f15 getEventsCase Uint caseID Object P returns the set of events related to a case
f16 getGlobalNumberOfEvents void Unit P returns global number of registered events
f17 getEvent Uint eventID Object P returns an event object
f18 getEventHash Uint eventID Hash P returns the hash of a specific event
f19 triggers void void P trigger functions to update the status of
the smart contract
of the transactions and the involved actors. Therefore, the contents can be modified only by participants
with specific roles (each function is implemented with concrete permissions, e.g. using the require clause
of solidity and variables such as msg:sender to check account authenticity), thus enabling secure access
control. For example, prosecutors will be able to open and close investigations, but investigators will be
able only to add new events to a specific investigation. In our setup, read-only functions and variables can
be checked by public users. Nevertheless, more sophisticated access control, policies and data protection
measures can be implemented by the users of the platform according to their specific needs.
The transactions tested in the developed private blockchain (e.g. deployment of the smart
contract, adding a new case and adding a new event) are performed in the order of milliseconds, and
thus, our approach enables real-time interactions. The implementations as well as the graphical interface
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Table 6: Relationship between smart contract functions and forensic procedures.
Forensic embezzlement procedure Code
Register new case f1, f2, f3
Evidence management f12, f13
Evidence analysis f8, f11, f12, f17, f18
Analysis & Report f8, f9, f10, f11, f14, f15, f18
Admin & Statistics f4, f13, f5, f6, f7, f9, f10, f14, f15, f14, f17, f19
web service are available on GitHub8.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss both the benefits and the challenges to be overcome in the blockchain digital
forensics field. Moreover, we provide a classification of such challenges across the different topics explored
in this work, namely, digital forensics, blockchain, and finance related crimes.
Blockchain and its benefits to a myriad of application scenarios have been thoroughly discussed
in the past [12, 81, 82, 83]. Features such as immutability, verifiability, auditability, security were
enhanced by the automation provided by smart contracts. For example, the existence of an event at
an specific time (e.g. the existence of a file, a good, a token or any kind of asset) can be verified in a
matter of milliseconds, due to the self-executing capabilities and the real time synchronization of the
information in the blockchain. The latter enables proof-of-existence when paired with the use of hashes,
which can be used to guarantee the trail of events as well as the proper preservation of the chain of
custody in the digital forensics context.
In addition, the benefits go further beyond the provision of a solid proof in court, since the
knowledge an evidence gathered in a case can be correlated in the future to reduce the time required to
find a vulnerability or speed up cybercrime investigations. This is particularly relevant in the finance
context, where all background and identification information can be stored. For instance, the Know
your Customer (KYC) can be processed easier and faster during investigations and be secured against
any internal fraudulent activities. On top of that, the application of smart contracts could prevent
8https://github.com/francasino/financial_forensics
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efforts for forgery and counterfeit documents. Therefore, the use of blockchain and its data mining
capabilities will foster collaboration between different entities to share information and enable the early
detection of embezzlement schemes. Moreover, evidences and reports can provide valuable input for the
elaboration of AI models with which increase the rate of embezzlement detection, since embezzlement
schemes sometimes last for more than 5 years.
Despite the aforementioned benefits, blockchain is not a panacea. There are still many chal-
lenges to overcome, such as the issues related with standardization of the procedures related with digital
crime prosecution. The latter includes cross border investigations, data storage and data sharing policies,
and the management of personal data. Note that the storage of personal data in a blockchain contradicts
the GDPR and the right to be forgotten [16, 15] due to immutability. Therefore, despite the unarguable
benefits of the immutability property, the capability of sharing an asset perpetually can be used with
malicious ends as already seen in the literature [84, 85, 86]. Moreover, this issue is not only affecting
blockchain but also decentralised permanent storage solutions, due to the lack of effective erasure mech-
anisms [6]. We believe the controlled erasure of data in blockchain, as well as similar systems, will be a
relevant research area in the near future and some authors are already investigating it [15, 87, 80, 88].
A further issue with blockchain is its lack of adoption in most of the countries [89], especially
the underdeveloped ones. The reasons strive from an insufficient technological infrastructure to a lack
of trust, as well as an unclear privacy management and data governance. Therefore, there is a spe-
cific need to invest in research and infrastructures to fill this gap, as well as the creation of policies,
recommendations and guidelines at an International level.
Another relevant flaw of blockchain is its scalability, which varies according to the volume of
transactions, verifiers/miners, consensus mechanism and other features. In this regard, it is well-known
that private flavours of blockchain are the most suitable for most of applications, yet their scalability
when the number of users and interactions grow also suffers performance issues [90, 91, 92, 78].
In our implementation, we minimise the amount of data stored in the blockchain by using hashes.
Nevertheless, our testing protocol focused on the underlying functionalities in order to showcase the
feasibility of robust digital investigation and verifiable chain of custody. Therefore, the implementation
of an advanced identity management system and the required policy definitions to overcome the issues
20
of cross border investigations are not covered in this paper, and are left for future research.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we recall the negative impact of financial crimes on society, focusing on embezzlement
scenarios. We provide a thorough state of the art of blockchain-based digital forensic approaches, which
are increasing their relevance in such investigations due to their inherent features. Next, we propose a
functional implementation of a forensically sound flow to investigate financial crimes, based on Ethereum,
and we test it with a real world embezzlement use case. The outcomes showed that our proposal empowers
integrity verification, tamper-proofness and adaptability towards other fraud and financial crimes. Later,
we discussed further benefits of such approach and the challenges that need to be overcome to enable its
wide adoption. Future work will focus on increasing the adaptability of the scheme by enabling other
functionalities as well as the migration to other blockchain systems. Moreover, we aim to provide a
robust identification mechanism to enable secure and private cross-border investigations.
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